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CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In his Brief of the Appellee, Peaden has made numerous statements of 
"facts11 which do not appear in the complaint and are not supported by any evidence 
before the Court. D.A. has prepared a Correction to Peaden's Statement of the Case 
including his Statement of Facts, which is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit A. 
Hopefully, the Court will review these corrections as necessary as it analyzes the 
following arguments in reply to Peaden's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Essentially every argument which Peaden makes in his brief fails to directly 
address the issues raised in D.A.'s initial brief. Instead, he sets up a series of 
"strawmen,11 asserting that D.A. made arguments it did not make, and then proceeds to 
knock them down. This is simply an attempt to divert the Court's attention from the 
real issues in this case. D.A. will challenge each of these strawmen in order and remind 
the Court, and Peaden's counsel, of the real issues in this case. 
POINT I 
POINTS I, II AND III OF PEADEN'S BRIEF ALL MISS 
THE POINT OF DA.'S ARGUMENT IN POINT I OF ITS 
BRIEF. 
D.A. did not claim that it was not given an opportunity to reschedule the 
hearing on September 23, 2003, nor that it wasn't given an opportunity to present the 
merits of its case at that hearing, as Peaden asserts in its Point I. Nor did D.A. claim 
that the lower court's decision was based on the fact that D.A.'s memorandum in 
opposition to Peaden's alternative motion for more definite statement had not been 
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filed, as Peaden asserts in its Points II and III. Thus, the six pages of Peaden's brief 
that address these claims are all irrelevant. 
D.A.'s actual argument in its Point I was that the lower court's dismissal was 
based on late filing of D.A.'s memorandum and affidavit in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss (not in opposition to the alternative motion for a more definite statement) 
and that, rather than admit the dismissal was on that ground, the court stated that the 
decision was on the merits and that it would proceed to hear the merits again at that 
time. Therefore, the court had taken a position on the merits before it heard 
arguments on the merits and before it had examined the memorandum and affidavit in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Courtesy copies of those opposition documents 
had not been delivered to the court, since a different motion had been scheduled for 
hearing at that time, and were probably not reviewed by the court.) Having already 
taken a position on the merits, the lower court was unlikely to change that position and 
confirmed that suspicion by ruling from the bench without having examined carefully 
the memorandum and affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss. This constituted 
irregularity in the proceedings, surprise or abuse of discretion which prevented a fair 
consideration of the merits. 
Had the lower court admitted that it had previously dismissed for late filing 
of opposition documents, as its Minute Entry and Order of June 26, 2002 stated, and 
admitted that the dismissal on that ground was a mistake or improper therefore let's 
proceed with the merits, D.A. would have no complaint about the proceedings. But, 
when the court stated it had considered the merits, it was admitting that it had 
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prejudged the case on the merits and it was unlikely to change its ruling. That is the 
whole point D.A. made in its Point I and Peaden has failed to address this issue by 
setting up the strawmen in its Points I, II and III. 
Peaden claims the transcript of the hearing reflects that the lower court read 
the opposing papers filed by D.A. A careful reading of that transcript, however, 
indicates only that the court looked at two paragraphs of the Young Affidavit but 
makes no reference to other portions of the affidavit or the Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. In fact, had the lower court considered that other 
information, it would not have dismissed the case on the merits since it is clear that the 
complaint stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment and that there was insufficient 
evidence before the court to determine whether the statute of limitations had expired. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURTS RULING IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AS CLAIMED IN 
PEADEN'S POINT IV. THE RECORD ON A MOTION TO 
DISMISS IS THE COMPLAINT. 
Again, Peaden sets up a strawman by asserting that D.A. suggested that a 
motion to dismiss must be supported by an affidavit from Peaden. D.A. made no such 
suggestion. In fact, D.A.'s whole position is that a motion to dismiss tests whether the 
facts stated in the complaint state a cause of action and affidavits from either side have 
little or no bearing on that question. 
Peaden further asserts that D.A. did not dispute the authenticity of the 
Notice of Interest and the Pre-Building Permit Report. That is true. D.A. did 
challenge Peaden's assertion that those documents establish facts upon which the lower 
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court could conclude that the statute of limitations had expired or that D.A. had 
"unclean hands.11 It is the interpretation of those documents which is challenged. The 
Notice of Interest does not establish the date on which improvements were finally 
completed and the Pre-Building Permit Report only stated that some improvements had 
been installed in Plat B as of the date of that report. It was clear from that report that 
some improvements had not been installed as of its date and no conclusion as to 
improvements in Plat C could be made from either document. Therefore, it is accurate 
to state that the lower court's decision was not supported in the record. 
Peaden argues that the dismissal was based on the allegations of the 
complaint, the Young Affidavit, those two documents and the representations of counsel 
at the hearing. The allegations of the complaint clearly state a cause of action for 
unjust enrichment. The Young Affidavit clearly states that improvements in Plat C 
were installed in 1997, 1998 and 1999 with some work yet to be completed as of 2002, 
and that improvements in Plat B continued through December of 1998. To conclude 
from those facts that the four-year statute of limitations had expired in 2001 is clearly 
erroneous. The representations of counsel at the hearing relied upon by Peaden, which 
is not evidence, was the statement that the improvements in Plats B and C were not 
installed at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded. [Hearing Transcript (Order), 
p. 36, lines 9-10]. If the lower court accepted that statement as fact, it had no basis on 
which to conclude that the improvements in Plats B and C were installed when the 
Notice of Interest was recorded in January, 1997, and that the statute of limitations 
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commenced to run on that date. Therefore, there is no support in the record to sustain 
a dismissal of the case. 
The standard on a motion to dismiss is not whether the district court's ruling 
is supported by the record. The standard is whether the facts stated in the complaint 
state a cause of action. Those facts, and all evidence before the court, must be 
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and the court must indulge all 
reasonable inferences it plaintiffs favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 
P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). The court is not to weigh the evidence nor to interpret any evidence in favor of 
Peaden. All possible interpretations in favor of D.A. must be indulged. The lower 
court failed in this regard and Peaden's attempt to find support in the record for the 
lower court's failure by citing the standard applicable after a trial on the merits must 
also fail. 
It is incredible that the lower court would make a ruling as a matter of law 
on a motion to dismiss on a matter that involves numerous and substantial facts without 
ever hearing evidence as to what those facts are. The complaint, of course, is only "a 
short and plain statement of the claim11 [Rule 8(a)(1), U.R.C.P.], an outline, if you will, 
and is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of all facts which may be relevant 
to all issues which could be raised in the case. If the complaint states a cause of action 
for unjust enrichment, which it clearly does, there is no justification for a dismissal. 
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POINT III 
DA.'S COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
COURT TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT. 
D.A.'s initial brief demonstrates that its complaint states a cause of action 
for unjust enrichment in three alternative forms as established by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234,1248 (Utah 1998), Concrete Products Co. v. Salt 
Lake County. 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987), Berrett v. Stevens. 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984), 
and Breitling Bros, v. Utah Golden Spikers. Inc.. 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979) and by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987). Peaden's 
brief cites Harline v. Daines. 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977), Desert Miriah. Inc. v. B & L 
Auto. Inc.. 12 P.3d 580 (Utah 2000) and L & A Drvwall v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 
P.2d 626, 630 (Utah 1980), which all support the same principle. In fact, his brief, page 
25, states: 
Unjust enrichment may be an appropriate remedy if property 
or services are conferred upon one person by another, the 
recipient appreciates or has knowledge of such property or 
services, the person receiving the property or services accepts 
such benefit and it would be "inequitable" for the person 
receiving the property or services to keep the same without 
being required to pay therefor. 
He might as well have been quoting from D.A.'s complaint in this case because that it 
precisely what is alleged therein. Peaden thus admits that the complaint states a cause 
of action. 
Peaden then cites Baugh v. Parley. 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947) for the 
proposition that unjust enrichment does not apply if the benefits are performed by the 
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plaintiff for its own advantage. The decision in that case, however, was based on the 
findings that: 
[The benefit conferred] did not increase the intrinsic value of 
the land. It did not give the defendant any legal rights which he 
did not previously have. It did not increase his estate, nor give 
him a position of greater security. It did not remove any legal 
liability. [184 P.2d 338]. 
In our case, however, the benefit conferred on Peaden increased the value of his land 
by $270,000 [Complaint, 1118, Addendum, Exhibit B], it gave him the legal right to 
obtain building permits on his lots, it increased the value of his estate by $270,000, 
giving him greater security and it removed the legal liability of not being able to use his 
lots for residential purposes. Baugh v. Parley requires that D.A. recover for the benefit 
conferred on Peaden. 
In his brief, Peaden ignores the law established in the foregoing Utah cases 
and relies totally on an isolated quotation from The Restatement of Restitution and 
upon an outdated case from California. Both of those sources rely on fact-intensive 
situations which cannot be applied here, at least until further proceedings disclose all 
of the relevant facts in this case. Again, for purposes of this motion to dismiss, the facts 
stated in the complaint are the only facts before the Court and those facts clearly 
establish a cause of action under Utah law. 
The Restatement of Restitution, upon which Peaden relies was adopted in 
1936 and the law on unjust enrichment has progressed since that date. For example, 
Quinneirs Septic & Well Service. Inc. v. Dehmlow. 152 Wis.2d 313,448 n.@.2d 16 (Wis. 
1989), held that the "Restatement rule does not bar recovery" for unjust enrichment 
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(which the Wisconsin court defines exactly as do the Utah courts) where the plaintiff 
installed a new septic system for the defendant, at the direction of the state, in order 
to bring the system in compliance with the local code. The court stated: 
We are satisfied that the benefit conferred upon the Dehmlows 
by Quinnell's installation of the lift system was not "incidental" 
to his obligation to the state within the meaning of the 
Restatement rule, and that the trial court correctly ruled that it 
would not be fair for the Dehmlows to enjoy the benefit of a 
new septic system without compensating Quinnell for his 
additional costs in providing it to them. 
Furthermore, the case of Storms v. Bergsieker, 254 Mont. 130, 835 P.2d 738 (Mont. 
1992), held that plaintiff could recover the prorated cost of replacing an unsafe bridge 
over an easement co-owned by plaintiff and defendants from defendants who were 
unjustly enriched by either the value of plaintiffs labor and materials furnished in the 
bridge construction or the value of the enhancement to the defendants' properties. In 
that case the defendants had not been consulted in advance about the bridge 
construction and it was contended that plaintiff was a volunteer in replacing the bridge. 
The court held otherwise. On the basis of these cases, both of which rely on the 
restatement rule, D.A. was not an officious volunteer in making the improvements to 
the lots of all owners in the subdivisions and the improvements to Peaden's lots were 
not incidental to the improvements to D.A.'s lots. 
Most importantly, however, is the more recent Utah case of Jeffs v. Stubbs, 
supra, which demonstrates that the law of unjust enrichment is far more complex and 
not limited to the circumstances referred to in the 1936 Restatement. That case makes 
it very clear that 
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. . . the facts underlying an unjust enrichment claim are often 
complex and vary greatly from case to case. Indeed, by its very 
nature, the unjust enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact 
situations that did not fit within a particular legal standard but 
which nonetheless merited judicial intervention. [1244-5]. 
Unjust enrichment must remain a flexible and workable 
doctrine. [1245]. 
. . . a court need not find that the defendant intended to 
compensate the plaintiff for the services rendered or that the 
plaintiff intended that the defendant be the party to make 
compensation. This is because the duty to compensate for 
unjust enrichment is an obligation implied by law without 
reference to the intention of the parties. 
Based on these standards of the Utah Supreme Court, it is error to dismiss a case, 
which obviously states a cause of action for unjust enrichment, before the court has 
heard any evidence. The evidence will show that the facts are, indeed, complex and 
may vary from those in other cases but nonetheless merit judicial intervention. "Unjust 
enrichment must remain a flexible and workable doctrine." Until all of the facts have 
been presented to the court, it is impossible to determine how "flexible and workable" 
the doctrine is. 
Peaden has argued that he "did not agree to pay" for the improvements to 
his lots, that he "did not request that the improvements be made," "nor was he 
requested to give approval" to the improvements. [Brief of the Appellee, pp. 28-9]. 
These statements are irrelevant in light of the standard in Jeffs that "a court need not 
find that the defendant intended to compensate the plaintiff for the services rendered 
or that the plaintiff intended that the defendant be the party to make compensation." 
But, those statements stand in stark contrast to the facts in the complaint, which are 
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true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, that Peaden was made "aware of the 
requirement to install and complete all improvements in the entire subdivisions,11 
[Complaint, 116, Addendum, Exhibit B] that Peaden "acknowledged the need to install 
such improvements and that such improvements would benefit him and increase the 
value of the lots owned by him and encouraged and requested plaintiff to proceed with 
the installation of such improvements" [Complaint, H7, Addendum, Exhibit B] and that 
Peaden "requested plaintiff to install the improvements which would also improve his 
lots." [Complaint, 1110, Addendum, Exhibit B]. These facts go beyond the requirements 
of unjust enrichment that Peaden have "an appreciation or knowledge" of the benefit 
conferred and the "acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value." Jeffs, at 1248. 
Peaden's reliance on the 1954 case of Major-Blakeney Corp.. 263 P.2d 655 
(CaLApp. 1954), to argue that D.A. was officious and that the improvements were 
incidental is also misplaced. In addition to the fact that the law of unjust enrichment 
has progressed since the date of that case 50 years ago, Peaden's reliance is on language 
in that case which is secondary to the main reason for denial of restitution. That court 
stated, at 664: 
The record is barren of proof that defendants in any fashion 
received any enhancement in the reasonable market value as a 
result of the character of improvements installed by plaintiff; 
nor is there proof that defendants derived any extra profit 
traceable to this source. On the contrary, the record shows that 
defendants received no more than they would have gotten if the 
transaction with plaintiff had materialized without interruption. 
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There was no benefit conferred upon the defendants in that case, the first essential 
requirement for an unjust enrichment claim, which would justify any payment to the 
plaintiff. 
The quotation from the Major-Blakeney case on page 27 of Peaden's brief 
also makes it clear that our case is different. It is there stated that lf[t]he whole 
situation negatives the idea that defendants were expected to participate financially" 
[263 P.2d 664]. In contrast, the D.A. complaint [MI 11 & 12, Addendum, Exhibit B] 
states that ff[p]laintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for such improvements11 
and fl[d]efendant knew or should have known that plaintiff expected to be so 
compensated.1' Thus, the second essential requirement for an unjust enrichment claim 
is present here but was not in Major-Blakeney. 
Furthermore, in Major-Blakeney, the lots owned by the defendants were not 
checkerboarded in the same subdivision with those of the plaintiff. The defendants 
there were free to improve their own lots and obtain building permits on them without 
regard to any improvements to the plaintiffs lots. In our case, neither party could 
obtain building permits without improving the lots of the other. All lots had to be 
improved at the same time and the benefit which one would be required to confer on 
the other would be substantial. In putting those improvements in, neither party could 
be accused of being an officious volunteer nor could the improvements or the benefit 
conferred be incidental. Improvements to all lots in the subdivision were required by 
the City of Riverton and it was impossible to improve the lots of one owner without 
improving the lots of others. To put the matter in perspective, assume Peaden wanted 
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to improve his lots so he could build on them (which was the purpose for which he 
acquired them). The City would have required him to improve all of the surrounding 
lots thus conferring a very substantial benefit on D.A. and others. Would Peaden or 
the court or anybody then consider that benefit to be voluntary or incidental? The 
answer is obvious. 
The whole question is whether the benefit was conferred officiously or 
gratuitously. That question is answered in Jeffs v. Stubbs, supra at 1246-7: 
"Officiousness means interference in the affairs of another not 
justified by the circumstances under which the interference takes 
place." Restatement of Restitution § 2 cmt. a (1937). Thus, an 
officious person is one who tfthrust[s] benefits upon others." Id. 
Here, the claimants did not interfere or thrust benefits on the 
UEP. To the contrary, the UEP encouraged the claimants to 
improve the land. 
Finally, the claimants did not confer their services gratuitously. 
One renders services gratuitously if at the time they were 
rendered, there was no expectation of "a return benefit, 
compensation, or consideration." Webster's New Int'l 
Dictionary 992 (3d ed. 1961); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d, 
Restitution § 26 (1973). 
Since the City of Riverton required D.A. to improve all lots in the subdivisions and 
since Peaden encouraged and requested D.A. to install the improvements, D.A. was not 
officious and did not thrust any benefit on Peaden. And since D.A. expected to be 
compensated by Peaden on a prorata basis, its installation of the improvements to 
Peaden's lots was not gratuitous. Peaden knew of the work being done. He knew of 
the benefit to him from that work and he did nothing to prevent it. That makes it 
inequitable for him to retain the benefit without paying for it. 
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The headings numbered 1 through 6 on pages 26-30 of Peaden's brief (and 
the text under those headings) are further "strawmen" in which he attempts to state 
facts which are not in the record and are contrary to the facts stated in the complaint. 
They are, therefore, not facts and should be disregarded. Nevertheless, they will be 
addressed seriatim. 
"1. Peaden has not retained money or benefits which belong to another." 
[Brief of the Appellee, p. 26]. 
D.A. has made no reference to money or benefits retained by Peaden which 
belong to another-only to benefits conferred the value of which should be reimbursed 
to D.A. because it is inequitable for Peaden to retain the benefits without paying for 
them. 
"2. Gene Peaden did not request that the improvements be made to his 
properties." [Brief of the Appellee, p. 28]. 
The complaint, 11 10 [Addendum, Exhibit A], states: "Defendant requested 
plaintiff to install the improvements which would also improve his lots." Since this fact 
is true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, Peaden's denial thereof must be 
disregarded. 
"3. Peaden did not agree to pay for general improvements which D.A. 
wanted to make to the development." [Brief of the Appellee, p. 29]. 
Recovery under unjust enrichment does not require the benefitted party to 
agree to pay for the improvements or even to intend to compensate the party 
13 
conferring the benefit. See Jeffs, supra, at 1246. It only requires an appreciation or 
knowledge of the benefit conferred. 
"4. Peaden has not retained money or benefits which belongs to D.A." 
[Brief of the Appellee, p. 29]. 
D.A. has not claimed that Peaden has retained money or benefits which 
belong to D.A. It has only claimed that Peaden has received benefits the value of 
which should be reimbursed to D.A. because it is inequitable for Peaden to retain the 
benefits without paying for them. 
"5. D.A. did not rely to its detriment upon any alleged request for 
improvements made by Peaden." [Brief of the Appellee, p. 30]. 
This may be an element of fraud but it is not an element of unjust 
enrichment. The complaint does allege that Peaden "encouraged and requested" D.A. 
to install the improvements and that D.A. "expected the defendant to compensate it for 
such improvements." [Complaint, Ml 7 & 11, Addendum, Exhibit B], D.A. moved 
ahead with the improvements in reliance on that encouragement, request and 
expectation. Thus, the further statement in Peaden's brief that "D.A. elected to go 
forward with the improvements knowing that other lots (sic) owners did not agree 
therewith" is not true. 
"6. Justice does not require Peaden to pay money to D.A." [Brief of the 
Appellee, p. 30], 
The fact that the improvements installed by D.A. benefitted its own lots 
does not mean that they did not also benefit the other 150 plus lots which it did not 
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own, including those owned by Peaden. All of the other owners of those lots have 
recognized the benefit conferred on them and have paid D.A. for the benefit conferred 
on them. Peaden is the only holdout who claims, disingenuously, that no benefit was 
conferred on him. In fact, the improvements to his lots conferred no benefit on D.A. 
since the increase in value to those lots benefits only Peaden and not D.A. Peaden's 
further attempt to appeal to the sympathy of the Court by arguing that it would be a 
"miscarriage of justice and an attack on public policy for this Court to allow a large 
commercial developer to recover from a private senior citizen" is another strawman. 
Those "facts" appear nowhere in the record and would be irrelevant if they did. Peaden 
does not state what public policy would be attacked. D.A. and Peaden, regardless of 
size or age, were both in the same situation with unimproved and unusable lots. With 
the encouragement and request of Peaden, D.A. improved all lots and conferred a 
substantial benefit on Peaden in doing so. It would be a miscarriage of justice-
inequitable, in the law of unjust enrichment~to allow Peaden to retain that benefit 
without paying therefor. 
POINT IV 
BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT, 
THE TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN AND 
THE YOUNG AFFIDAVIT, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DOES NOT BAR D.A.'S CLAIMS OF QUANTUM MERUIT 
OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The complaint gives no dates when improvements were installed. The 
Notice of Interest likewise gives no dates when improvements were installed. Peaden 
simply assumes from the date of recording of the Notice of Interest that all 
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improvements were installed prior to that date. That assumption is contrary to his 
Statement of Fact No. 18 which claims that "the improvements had not been made to 
numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded." That assumption is also 
contrary to the law which requires that all reasonable inferences be made in favor of 
D.A. The Pre-Building Permit Report also does not state when all the improvements 
were installed-only that some improvements had been installed by the date thereof. 
It is also clear from the report that some roads had not been asphalted by that date. 
It makes no reference to the culinary water lines and laterals and other utilities, 
sidewalks, street lighting and park improvements. It also applies only to Plat B and thus 
could not possibly be the basis for establishing the dates of improvements to Peaden's 
lots in Plat C. 
To counter the inferences that Peaden attempted to draw from those two 
documents, Steven R. Young of D.A. filed an affidavit [Addendum, Exhibit E], dated 
April 17, 2002, which states: 
Improvements installed in Plat B during 1998 . . . include the 
sidewalks, parks and park strips, water meters, fencing and some 
water, sewer and other utility lines. . . . These improvements 
continued through December of 1998. [Young Affidavit, K 5]. 
The improvements in Plat C commenced in November of 
1997 and were installed throughout 1998 and 1999 and, as 
stated above, there is still work to be done in Plat C consisting 
of repair to sidewalks damaged during construction of homes 
and the installation of street lights. [Young Affidavit, H 4]. 
Therefore, the undisputed facts before the Court are that improvements in both Plats 
B and C were installed after November of 1997 and continued through 1998 for Plat 
B and 1999 and 2002 for Plat C. These facts are directly contrary to the inferences 
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which Peaden attempted to draw from the two documents it submitted which make no 
reference to the date of installation of any of the improvements. If any contradiction 
exists, it must be resolved in favor of D.A. and not in favor of Peaden. The lower court 
clearly committed error in this regard. 
Furthermore, the lower court had no information before it to determine if 
the statute of limitations had been tolled by Peaden's absence from the state [See §78-
12-35] or by payments made by Peaden on D.A.'s claim. [See §78-12-44]. In fact, 
Peaden made two payments on D.A.'s claim in 2001, one for $7500 and one for $12000. 
[See Amended Complaint in Peaden v. Development Associates, Inc., Civil No. 
030912033,1111 47, 49, 55 and 56, Addendum, Exhibit F]. Thus, even though the statute 
of limitations had not expired on its face, it had been tolled by these payments. This 
information, which would have been disclosed through discovery, is only additional 
ground why it was error for the lower court to dismiss the complaint before all relevant 
facts were before the court. 
POINT V 
PEADEN, IN POINT VIII OF HIS BRIEF, HAS 
CONFUSED AN ORAL OR EXPRESS CONTRACT WITH AN 
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT. THE LAW CITED BY HIM 
HAS NO APPLICATION HERE. 
The argument which Peaden makes in his Point VIII makes it clear that he 
does not understand the nature of an implied-in-fact contract. (Alternatively, this is 
another strawman which he has set up to knock down). He argues first that an implied-
in-fact contract is barred by §78-12-25, which applies to a liability "not founded upon 
an instrument in writing." He wrongly equates an oral contract to an implied-in-fact 
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contract. As is made clear in the Utah Supreme Court cases which define a cause of 
action for unjust enrichment: 
Unjust enrichment is a doctrine under which the law will imply 
a promise to pay for goods or services when there is neither an 
actual nor an implied contract between the parties. 'The 
promise is purely fictitious and is implied in order to fit the 
actual cause of action to the remedy.11 Concrete Products Co. 
v. Salt Lake County. 734 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah 1987), quoting 
Rapp v. Salt Lake Citv, 527 P.2d 651, 654-5 (Utah 1974). 
The Court of Appeals has also stated this same principle, in Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah App. 1987): 
Quantum meruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to recover 
payment for labor performed in a variety of circumstances in 
which that plaintiff, for some reason, would not be able to sue 
on an express contract. Recovery under quantum meruit 
presupposes that no written or oral contract exists. 
Unjust enrichment is most often applied as an alterative when proof of an actual 
contract, written or oral, fails. Thus, Peaden's arguments that the absence of an oral 
or express contract prevents recovery in unjust enrichment, are misplaced. 
On page 34 of his brief, Peaden refers to the requirements of an implied-in-
fact contract set forth in Davies v. Olson and correctly states: 
Under Utah law, the elements needed to establish an implied-
in-fact contract are: (1) Peaden requested D.A. to perform the 
work: (2) D.A. expected Peaden to compensate it for the work 
requested; and (3) Peaden knew or should have known that 
D.A. expected compensation for such work. 
Peaden then states: "None of the foregoing elements is satisfied in this case." This 
statement totally ignores the facts stated in the complaint (which, again, are true for 
purposes of this motion), paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 [Addendum, Exhibit B]: 
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10. Defendant requested plaintiff to install the 
improvements which would also improve his lots. 
11. Plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for 
such improvements. 
12. Defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff 
expected to be so compensated. 
This intentional ignoring of the facts in the complaint to construct his own strawmen to 
distract attention from the real issues in this case is simply disingenuous. His own 
arguments establish that the complaint states a cause of action. 
POINT VI 
THE DOCTRINES OF LACHES, UNCLEAN HANDS 
AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DO NOT APPLY HERE AND 
THERE IS NO SUPPORT IN THE RECORD TO SUSTAIN 
ANY OF THESE DOCTRINES. 
Peaden has asserted in the heading to his Point IX that D.A.'s claims are 
barred by laches, unclean hands and equitable estoppel. He then fails to make any 
argument, cite any authority or refer to any evidence which would support an argument 
with respect to laches or equitable estoppel. Indeed, there is none. He then asserts 
that D.A. had unclean hands in recording the Notice of Interest before work was 
commenced in Plat C. He fails to mention, of course, that this argument would not 
apply to Plat B and, therefore, there is no justification to dismiss the complaint on this 
ground with respect to the lots in Plat B. He also fails to mention that the lower court 
expressly stated that it was not relying on this ground in its decision to dismiss the 
complaint. The lower court stated: 
On the issue of whether or not there was equity, there's 
certainly an argument that there was no equity on the part of 
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the developer, but I think that's not a necessary element of the 
Court's decision here. [Hearing Transcript (Motion) p., 56, 
attached to Brief of the Appellee]. 
Despite this statement by the lower court, Peaden's attorney prepared an Order which 
included a conclusion that D.A. was guilty of unclean hands. [Order Dismissing Case, 
K 20, Exhibit A to Brief of Appellant]. D.A. objected to this conclusion in the Order 
but the lower court, nevertheless, signed the Order. 
The issue of unclean hands in equity is a fact-sensitive matter. To conclude 
that D.A. had unclean hands without hearing any evidence on the subject is remarkable! 
In fact, the lower court made no finding of fact which would support such a conclusion. 
The conclusion that D.A. had unclean hands by the recording of a Notice of Interest, 
when it had already completed substantial improvements in Plats A and B, without any 
testimony of the circumstances and the intentions of D.A., is contrary to the law which 
requires that all inferences be made in favor of D.A. Rather, the lower court has 
construed the facts and made all inferences against D.A., which is reversible error. 
Furthermore, equity is a comparative matter and, as pointed out in D.A.'s 
original brief, it is a huge jump to conclude that D.A. had "unclean hands11 just because 
it recorded the Notice of Interest. In fact, it is blatantly hypocritical for Peaden, who 
has received a huge benefit from D.A., by the improvements which increased the value 
of his lots by approximately $270,000, which he refuses to pay for, to claim that D.A. 
has "unclean hands." He should be praising and thanking D.A. for conferring such a 
benefit on him. Instead, he has raised this additional strawman that D.A. recorded a 
Notice of Interest, which caused him no loss or harm whatsoever and which has since 
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been released. He has, in fact, sold at least two of his lots at a huge gain. It is his 
hands that are unclean. 
Peaden, in a footnote on page 36 of his brief, has suggested that the 
recording of the Notice of Interest is a slander of title. That, of course, is not an issue 
before this Court and there is nothing in the record to support such a claim. Peaden 
has, in a separate case, sued D.A. for slander of title [Addendum, Exhibit F], which 
claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for slander. That matter was not 
litigated below and is, therefore, not properly before this Court. 
POINT VII 
NEITHER THE UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
NOR THE WRONGFUL LIEN STATUTE IS AN ISSUE 
BEFORE THIS COURT, AS ARGUED BY PEADEN IN HIS 
POINT X. 
Peaden has again raised strawmen in the form of the Mechanic's Lien 
Statute and the Wrongful Lien Statute neither of which was relied upon by D.A. in 
filing its complaint or in its brief. The Mechanic's Lien Statute has no application here 
since D.A. asserted no claim thereunder and it believed it could not assert a claim 
thereunder because it did not have a contract with Peaden to perform the work, as is 
required by §38-l-7(l)(b). While Peaden tried to argue below that the Notice of 
Interest was a wrongful lien, the lower court did not so conclude and there was no 
finding of fact nor evidence upon which such a conclusion could be based. Peaden 
knows this is not a proper issue before this Court because he has filed a separate action 
against D.A. asserting a wrongful lien based on the Notice of Interest. [See Complaint 
in Peaden v. Development Associates, Inc., Addendum, Exhibit F]. It is improper for 
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Peaden to present these issues to this Court and this Court should ignore his arguments 
with respect thereto. 
Peaden's suggestion both below and here that the Utah Mechanic's Lien 
Statute is the sole remedy for one who has performed services or installed 
improvements which benefited another party is to suggest that the law of unjust 
enrichment does not exist. Those who make claims under the Mechanic's Lien Statute 
or the Construction Bond Statute regularly add an alternative claim for unjust 
enrichment in case their lien or bond claims fail. See, for example, Bailey-Allen Co., 
Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah App. 1997); Breitling Brothers Construction, 
Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers. 597 P.2d 869, 871, 872 (Utah 1979). As is stated in 
Concrete Products and Davies v. Olson, supra, unjust enrichment is the means by which 
one can recover if a contractual or other claim fails. It is an equitable alterative to legal 
claims in order to provide a means of recovery to one who has conferred a benefit on 
another. 
POINT VIII 
PEADEN'S POINT XI ON "GOOD CAUSE" FOR THE 
LOWER COURTS ORIGINAL DISMISSAL BASED ON 
LATE-FILING IS UNRESPONSIVE AND IRRELEVANT. 
In arguing that the "good cause" finding was supported, Peaden simply lists 
documents which were before the lower court but makes no reference to any facts in 
those documents which supported the lower court's Minute Entry Decision and Order 
of June 26, 2002 [Brief of Appellant, Addendum, Exhibit B]. In fact he includes in that 
list "[t]he representations of facts made by D.A. at the hearings before the Court" 
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without explaining that no hearings had been held before the Court when that June 26, 
2002 Order was entered. D.A. relies on the information on pages 15-18 of its initial 
brief on this issue and makes this additional point. If the June 26, 2002 Order was 
based on anything other than the stated reason of late-filing of opposition documents, 
the lower court was obligated by Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. to so state. That rule provides: 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decisions on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on 
more than one ground. 
Either the lower court violated this rule or its June 26, 2002 Order was based on the 
stated reason of late-filing of opposition documents and not on the merits and D.A.'s 
position that the lower court had pre-judged the merits is well-founded. 
POINT IX 
DA. DID NOT OBJECT TO THE LOWER COURTS 
CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC DOCUMENTS-ONLY TO 
ITS INTERPRETATION THEREOF, 
Peaden constructs one more strawman by claiming that D.A. objected to the 
lower court's consideration of the extrinsic documents referred to. D.A. has made no 
such objection. We have objected only to the lower court's interpretation of those 
documents. They do not say what Peaden and the lower court claims for them. It is 
not the lower court's province, on a motion to dismiss, to interpret those documents 
unless it indulges all inferences in favor of D.A. This it failed to do, as we have already 
set forth in Point IV above. 
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POINT X 
PEADEN'S POINTS XIII, XIV AND XV ARE 
IRRELEVANT AND UNRESPONSIVE TO THE ARGUMENTS 
IN DA.'S BRIEF. 
The final strawmen raised by Peaden in its final three points do not respond 
to any argument raised by D.A. on this appeal. D.A. has not made an argument with 
respect to its Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment because that was simply raised 
below as an alternative to, and on the same grounds asserted for, its other motions. 
Peaden again asserts that D.A.'s motions were based on a "two-day delay in the filing 
of a response to Peaden's alternative motion for a more definite statement . . . ." 
Nowhere has D.A. made such an argument. The June 26, 2002 Minute Entry and 
Order was based on the two-day late filing of opposition to Peaden's Motion to Dismiss 
and not on Peaden's later Motion for a More Definite Statement. Peaden recognizes 
this when he states that "Peaden's alternative motion for more definite statement 
became meaningless after the District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss, and 
was properly disregarded by the District Court." 
Likewise, D.A. has not argued before this Court that the lower court erred 
in treating the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. It has, however, argued 
that it is improper, in a fact-sensitive issue, to dismiss until discovery and further 
proceedings bring all relevant facts to the attention of the court. The complaint, after 
all, is only "a short and plain statement of the claim" [Rule 8(a), U.R.C.P.] and is not 
intended to be a comprehensive recitation of all facts which might be relevant. If the 
complaint states a cause of action, it should not be dismissed. 
2A 
Finally, D.A. has only stated that the lower court did not consider the 
Amended Complaint because of the dismissal of the complaint and that it should be 
considered by the lower court on remand. This is not the time to determine if the 
Amended Complaint states a cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
Peaden has failed to directly address the arguments presented in D.A.'s 
initial brief but has, instead, attempted to confuse the issues and distract the attention 
of the Court by attacking arguments which D.A. did not make. The only issue before 
the Court is whether the complaint states a cause of action. Peaden has quoted from 
authorities which basically use the words which appear in the complaint to define a 
cause of action for unjust enrichment. His own authorities require the lower court's 
dismissal to be reversed and that should be the ruling of this Court. 
DATED this _%_ day of April, 2004. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ralph J. Marsh i 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Tab A 
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On a motion to dismiss a complaint the allegations of the complaint are 
accepted as true and constitute the facts upon which the case must be decided. Yet, 
Appellee ("Peaden") has included in his statement of the case numerous "facts" which 
do not appear in the complaint nor is there any other evidence to support those "facts." 
While some of those so-called facts may be harmless, Appellant ("D.A.") considers it 
necessary to correct many of them that may not be harmless. The only facts before the 
Court are contained in the Complaint [Addendum, Exhibit B], the Notice of Interest 
[Addendum, Exhibit C], the Pre-Building Permit Report [Addendum, Exhibit D] and 
the Affidavit of Steven R. Young in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss [Addendum, 
Exhibit E]. 
On page 4 of his brief, Peaden states that "D.A. attempted to compel 
Peaden to sell his lots to D.A. but Peaden refused to sell. Peaden also refused to agree 
in advance to pay D.A. for its development expenses." D.A. did not attempt to compel 
Peaden to sell his lots and there is no evidence before the court to suggest anything 
other than that D.A. offered to buy Peaden's lots. [See Young Affidavit, 1f6, Addendum 
Exhibit E]. There is also no evidence to support the statement that Peaden refused to 
agree in advance to pay D.A. for its development expenses. The complaint states that 
Peaden "requested plaintiff to install the improvements which would also improve his 
lots." [Complaint, IflO, Addendum, Exhibit B]. There is no statement anywhere that 
suggests that Peaden refused to agree in advance to pay for development expenses. 
i 
Also on page 4, Peaden states that the complaint seeks to recover for the 
improvements D.A. had made for its own benefit. The truth is that D.A. seeks to 
recover for the improvements it made for Peaden's benefit. [Complaint, H1f 18 and 21, 
Addendum, Exhibit B: "value of the benefit conferred,11 !tbenefits received by him.11]. 
On page 5 of his brief, Peaden states that the Young Affidavit "clarified that 
Peaden had never agreed to pay for any of the alleged development costs." This 
statement is irrelevant since unjust enrichment only requires that D.A. expected Peaden 
to compensate it for the improvements or that Peaden had an appreciation or 
knowledge of the benefit conferred on him and not that he agreed to pay for the 
improvements. Peaden did request D.A. "to proceed with the installation of such 
improvements." [Complaint, 117, Addendum, Exhibit B]. 
Course of Proceedings 
On page 6 of his brief, Peaden admits that the "District Court made its 
ruling in part believing that no timely opposition had been filed." That, of course, begs 
the question. If the court dismissed the case because no timely opposition had been 
filed, it did not rule on the merits. If the court did review the memorandum and 
affidavit in opposition which were in the file and were referred to in the Notice to 
Submit for Decision, it would not have stated in its ruling that "no timely opposition 
being filed." It is quite obvious that the court had not reviewed the memorandum and 
affidavit in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss when it granted the Motion to Dismiss. 
But, at the later hearing on the Motion to Amend Findings, For Newr Trial, To Alter 
or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment, the court brushed the matter aside 
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stating that it would not have dismissed for late filing by two days thus implying that its 
prior ruling had been on the merits. [See Hearing Transcript (Motion), pp. 5-6, 
attached to Brief of the Appellee]. Therefore, it took a position on the merits without 
having reviewed the documents in opposition and without having heard any arguments. 
It was, therefore, predisposed to a dismissal on the merits, did not have courtesy copies 
of the documents in opposition before it and did not review those documents before it 
ruled from the bench dismissing the case on the merits. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
On page 8 of his brief, Peaden states that "D.A.'s appellate brief does not 
cite to either of the hearing transcripts held before the District Court and many of the 
statements made by D.A. are not supported by and are inconsistent with those hearing 
transcripts." This statement is untrue and ignores the fact that on a motion to dismiss 
the complaint the facts stated in the complaint are taken to be true and must be 
construed in the light most favorable to D.A. Statements of counsel or the court at the 
hearing are not evidence. The only facts which the court is allowed to consider are 
those stated in the complaint and in the Affidavit of Steven R. Young. 
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In paragraph 4 on page 10 of his brief, Peaden states that "D.A. used the 
unlawful Notice of Interest in an effort to compel Peaden to pay money to D.A. before 
removing its unlawful cloud from Peaden's Property." This statement is not true and 
is not supported by any fact in the complaint or the Young Affidavit. It is true that an 
offer was made to purchase Peaden's lots which he turned down, and he was requested 
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to agree to pay his share of the improvement expenses [Young Affidavit, H6, 
Addendum, Exhibit E]. Peaden also requested D.A. to install the improvements and 
acknowledged the benefit to him to do so. [Complaint, 1f1f 7 and 10, Addendum, Exhibit 
B]. There was no attempt to compel Peaden to pay any money and there has been no 
proper determination that the Notice of Interest was unlawful. 
In paragraph 9 on page 11 of his brief, Peaden states that "Young also 
testifies in his Affidavit that Peaden did not agree or represent to D.A. that he would 
pay for the improvements to the development made or to be made by D.A." This 
statement is not true and is an incorrect conclusion drawn from Young's statement, in 
paragraph 6 of his affidavit, that all of the other owners of lots "acknowledged the 
benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either to sell their lots or to 
participate in the costs on a prorata basis except for the owners of eight lots, including 
those owned by defendant Gene Peaden." That conclusion is contrary 1o the statement 
in paragraph 7 that Peaden "acknowledged the need to install such improvements and 
the benefit to him by doing so and encouraged us to proceed with the installation of 
such improvements" and in paragraphs 7 and 10 of the Complaint [Addendum, Exhibit 
B] that Peaden "requested plaintiff to proceed with the installation of such 
improvements." These statements must be taken as true for purposes of the motion to 
dismiss. 
In paragraph 18 on pages 12-13 of his brief, Peaden states that "D.A.'s 
counsel further represented to the District Court that D.A. would have previously 
removed its Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property had such request been made 
i/ 
pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had not been made to 
numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder.11 Yes, D.A.'s counsel stated that the Notice of Interest would have 
been released had a request been made pursuant to the statute but he did not state as 
the reason that the improvements had not been made. In fact, no reason was stated. 
In paragraph 19 on page 13 of his brief, Peaden states that Riverton City's 
PreBuilding Permit Report "reflects that all curb, gutter, fire apparatus, road base 
and/or asphalt were installed before November 11, 1997." This is also not true. First 
of all, that report applied only to Plat B and could not be the basis for any conclusion 
with respect to improvements in Plat C. Secondly, it says nothing about the culinary 
water lines and laterals and other utilities, sidewalks, street lighting and park 
improvements and it states that some roads are unpaved. That report could not be the 
basis for determining the date when all improvements were installed. In fact, the 
Young affidavit, in paragraphs 3-5, states that improvements were installed in Plat B 
during 1998 and in Plat C in 1998 and 1999 and that there was still work to be done. 
In paragraph 20 on page 13 of his brief, Peaden states that the complaint 
"did not allege that Peaden had made any payment to D.A. for any of the alleged 
improvements made by D.A. to the development." His reason for making that 
statement is to avoid a tolling of the statute of limitations by payment of a portion of 
the amount due. Such a payment need not be disclosed in the complaint but is 
something which discovery would disclose. It is, therefore, premature to dismiss a case 
until that discovery can be conducted. As a matter of fact, Peaden made two payments 
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to D.A. in 2001, one for $7,500 and one for $12,000, which extended the statute of 
limitations for four years after those payments in 2001. [See Amended Complaint in 
Peaden v. Development Associates, Inc., Civil No. 030912033, If 47, 49, 55 and 56, copy 
attached hereto as Exhibit FJ. 
In paragraphs 24 and 25 on pages 13 and 14 of his brief, Peaden states that 
"D.A.'s brief makes spurious statements about the manner in which Judge Bohling 
addressed and adjudicated the pending motions before the District Court," without 
specifying or making reference to the alleged spurious statements, and "Many, if not 
most, of the procedural statements and challenges made by D.A. are directly 
inconsistent with the actual events which occurred at the hearing," wiithout specifying 
or making reference to the alleged inconsistent events. D.A. believes that none of its 
statements are spurious and all of them are consistent with the actual events as 
reflected in the transcripts of the hearings. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE PEADON, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, for its causes of action against defendant, alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and claims 
an interest in the real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah which is 
the subject of this action. 
3. Plaintiff is and has been the owner of numerous residential lots in The 
Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions located at approximately 13800 South and 
4800 West in Salt Lake County which were unimproved at the time they were 
acquired, having no approved roads, curb & gutter, and no connections to water, 
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sewer, power, fuel and telephone systems, and for which it was impossible to obtain 
building permits for the construction of homes thereon. 
4. Defendant was and is the owner of Lots 320, 322 and 334, The 
Foothills Plat "B" Subdivision, and Lots 379, 380 and 555, The Foothills Plat " C 
Subdivision, which were similarly unimproved and for which it was impossible for 
defendant to obtain building permits for the construction of homes thereon. 
5. In order to obtain building permits on its lots, plaintiff was required 
by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City to install and complete all subdivision 
improvements, not just for the lots owned by it, but for all lots located within The 
Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions. 
6. Before proceeding to install and complete the subdivision 
improvements, plaintiff contacted defendant and made defendant aware of the 
requirement to install and complete all improvements in the entire subdivisions and 
requested defendant to agree to reimburse plaintiff for his share of the costs of such 
improvements prorated to the lots owned by him if plaintiff installed and completed 
such improvements so that defendant could obtain building permits for his lots. 
7. Defendant acknowledged the need to install such improvements and 
that such improvements would benefit him and increase the value of the lots owned 
by him and encouraged and requested plaintiff to proceed with the installation of 
such improvements. 
8. Plaintiff thereafter completed all such improvements as required by 
Salt Lake County and later Riverton City for the benefit of all lots in The Foothills 
Plats MB" and " C Subdivisions at a total cost of $2,381,302 for Plat "B" and $3,134,044 
for Plat "C\ These amounts, prorated to the 159 lots in Plat "B", equals $14,977.00 
per lot in Plat "B", and to the 200 lots in Plat "C , equals $15,670.22. Defendant's 
prorata share of those costs for his six lots is $91,941.66. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Quantum Meruit—Contract implied in fact) 
9. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
8 above. 
? 
10. Defendant requested plaintiff to install the improvements which 
would also improve his lots. 
11. Plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for such 
improvements. 
12. Defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff expected to be 
so compensated. 
13. Defendant is obligated to reimburse plaintiff the reasonable value of 
plaintiffs services in installing and completing the improvements, which plaintiff 
alleges is $91,941.66, plus fifteen percent for overhead and developer fees, together 
with interest thereon at the legal rate, both before and after judgment, from the time 
such services were performed until paid. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Quantum Meruit-Contract implied in law) 
14. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
8 above. 
15. Defendant has received the benefit of six fully improved lots in The 
Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions on which building permits can now be 
obtained. 
16. Defendant had and has an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit 
conferred upon him. 
17. It would be unjust for the defendant to retain that benefit without 
paying for it. 
18. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant the value of the benefit 
conferred which plaintiff alleges is $45,000 per lot or a total of $270,000. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
19. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
18 above. 
20. Defendant has received, accepted and retained benefits which in 
equity and justice belong to plaintiff. 
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21. Defendant should be required to pay for the benefits received by him, 
which plaintiff alleges is $45,000 per lot or a total of $270,000. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendant in the 
alternative as follows: 
1. Under the first cause of action for quantum meruit for a contract 
implied in fact in the amount of $91,941.66, plus fifteen percent for overhead and 
developer fees, together with interest thereon at the legal rate, both before and after 
judgment, from the time such services were performed until paid; 
2. Under the second cause of action for quantum meruit for a contract 
implied in law in the amount of $270,000; 
3. Under the third cause of action for unjust enrichment in the amount 
of $270,000; 
4. For plaintiffs costs incurred herein and for such other relief as the 
Court may determine plaintiff is entitled to. 
DATED this J f l day of March, 2002. 
BACKMAN^LARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh I 
Attornevs for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
141 East 5600 South, Suite 110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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NOTICE CF INTEREST 
The imdereigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts 
an interest in subject property pursuant to their inprcwenients and 
developments which benefit the following described property: 
Lots 11, 17, 27, 28, 30-34, iixrlraive, 36, 38, 42, 44, 45, 46, 56, 62, 
63, 79, 114, 145-148, inclusive, 151, 152, 153, 154, 164, 182, 183, 187, 
188, 194, 195, 198 and 199, THE FOOTBIHS - HAT "A", according to the 
official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, 
Lots 236-251, inclusive, 261-277, inclusive, and 281-288 inclusive, THE 
KJOTHILCS - PLOT "B", according to the official plat thereof, as recorded 
in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Lots 205-235, inclusive, 252-260, inclusive, 278-280, inclusive, 289-363, 
inclusive, THE HXD1HIILS - PLAT "B-l", according to the official plat 
thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Lots 364-556, inclusive, THE FOOTHILLS - PLAT "C", according to the 
official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Ivccorder. 
Dated this 7th day of January, 1997. 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Vice President 
STKTE OF UTAH ) 
) as. 
axam OF SAUT LAKE ) 
On the 7th day of January, 1997, personally appeared before ne 
MEHFCN P. SHIPP, who being by ne duly sworn, did say, for himself, that 
he, the said MnflCN P. SHIPP is the VICE PRESIDEOT of EEVEL0SPWEOT 
ASSOCIATES, INC. Ccnpany, and that the within and foregoing instrunant 
waB signed in behalf of said corporation fcy authority of a resolution of 
its board of directors, and said KII/TON P. SHIPP each duly cctoowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal aff * 
is the seal of the 3aid corporation. 
NfltAUV MJilLIC 
WILLIAM R. ROEDEA 
1509 80um 3300 Etil 
841 U k t City. Utah &410B 
My Commlw ton Explrift 
OctoDlf 10.1909 
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE PEADEN, 
Defendant. 
INC., 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. 
YOUNG IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 020902121 
(Judge William B. Bohling) 
STEVEN R. YOUNG, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I am the president of the plaintiff in the above matter and have 
personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter stated. 
2. Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that this action is 
untimely because the improvements installed by plaintiff in Plats B and C, The 
Foothills Subdivision, were all installed in 1997. While some improvements were 
installed in 1997, all of the improvements required to be installed by the City of 
Riverton have not yet been installed and further costs will be incurred to install those 
improvements. The improvements yet to be completed include replacing broken 
sidewalks and the installation of street lights. 
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3. The Pre-Building Permit Report issued by Riverton City, upon which 
defendant relies, does not state that all required improvements were in on the dates 
indicated. In fact, it clearly states that some of the roads had not been asphalted. 
See the handwritten note: "Make sure to maintain unpaved roads for fire equipment 
access.11 The purpose of that report, as is clear from its title, was only to indicate that 
the installation of improvements had progressed to the point that building permits for 
the construction of homes could be issued. That report applies only to Plat B and 
not to Plat C. 
4. The improvements in Plat C commenced in November of 1997 and 
were installed throughout 1998 and 1999 and, as stated above, there is still work to 
be done in Plat C consisting of repair to sidewalks damaged during construction of 
homes and the installation of street lights. 
5. Improvements installed in Plat B during 1998, all of which were 
required by Riverton City in order to allow the issuance of building permits, include 
the sidewalks, parks and park strips, water meters, fencing and some water, sewer 
and other utility lines. We have invoices and cancelled checks to show what and 
when improvements were made and when they were paid for. These improvements 
continued through December of 1998. 
6. Development Associates initially acquired approximately 400 of the 
total of 556 lots in the three Foothills subdivisions. The lots not acquired by 
Development Associates and owned by others, including the defendant, are marked 
in yellow on the attached plat map. No building permits could be obtained on any 
of the lots because they were unimproved. Because the lots owned by others were 
interspersed among the lots acquired by us, it was impossible to install the 
improvements to our lots without also installing the improvements to all lots. 
Riverton City required us to install improvements in the entire subdivisions to their 
current standards (as opposed to the standards in place when the subdivision was 
approved and recorded). Before doing so, we tried to contact all of the owners of 
other lots to either purchase their lots or obtain their agreement to participate in the 
costs of the improvements. All of the other owners, either before or after the 
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improvements were completed, acknowledged the benefit to them of the 
improvements and agreed either to sell their lots or to participate in the costs on a 
prorata basis except for the owners of eight lots, including those owned by defendant 
Gene Peaden. 
7. Mr. Peaden was also contacted and acknowledged the need to install 
such improvements and the benefit to him by doing so and encouraged us to proceed 
with the installation of such improvements. 
8. The improvements made to the lots owned by others were not made 
by us voluntarily but were required by Riverton City and such improvements were not 
incidental to the improvements to our lots. That is, the sewer, water, power, gas, 
telephone and cable lines and connections to the other lots and the roads, curb and 
gutter and sidewalks in front of those lots did not benefit our lots. They only 
benefitted their lots. Nor were the costs of such improvements incidental since they 
amount to approximately $15,000 per lot. 
9. The benefit conferred upon the other lot owners is not incidental but 
is substantial since before the improvements were installed, those lots had a value of 
a few hundred dollars and since the improvements those lots are valued at over 
$50,000 each. 
DATED this £L day of April, 2002. 
sven 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
STEVEN R. YOUNG, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is individual who signed the foregoing affidavit; that he has read said affidavit 
and knows and understands the contents thereof; that the same is true of his 
knowledge, except as to matters therein stated on information and belief and as to 
these matters he believes it to be true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before 
N O I X M PLBLIC 
RALPH J. MARSH 
68 South Main Street Ste 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
My Commission Expires 
September 24, 2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
ay of April, 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the 26 day of April, 2002, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. YOUNG IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to the following: 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah_£4145-0385 
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STEVEN W. CALL (5260) 
BENJAMIN J. KOTTER (9592) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Gene Peaden 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GENE PEADEN, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 030912033 
Judge: L. A. Dever 
Gene Peaden, the plaintiff in this action by and through his counsel of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, complains against Development Associates, Inc., and for claims for relief alleges as 
follows: 
THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Gene Peaden is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Defendant Development Associates, Inc., ("DAI") is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
THE PROPERTY 
3. The building lots upon which this action is commenced are located in the 
Foothills subdivision, which is located at approximately 13800 South 4800 West, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 5, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
5. The Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant DAI pursuant to the service 
of process that has or will be made upon it. 
6. Venue is proper in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7, because plaintiff's claims for relief arose in Salt Lake County and 
because defendant does business in Salt Lake County. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. On January 10, 1997, DAI intentionally caused a Notice of Interest to be 
recorded against numerous lots owned by Gene Peaden. 
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8. A copy of the Notice of Interest is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
9. The Notice of Interest affirmatively asserts that DAI has an interest in Peaden's 
Property as follows: 
The undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an 
interest in subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments 
which benefit the following described property: 
10. On May 26, 1999, written demand was made upon DAI to have the Notice of 
Interest released from the Salt Lake County public records as a claim or interest against 
Peaden's Building Lots. 
11. A copy of the foregoing written demand is attached as Exhibit B and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
12. The foregoing demand was served by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
upon DAI. 
13. On October 1, 1999, a second written demand was made upon DAI to have its 
Notice of Interest released from the Salt Lake County public records as a claim or interest 
against Peaden's Building Lots. 
14. A copy of this second written demand is attached as Exhibit C and incorporated 
herein by reference 
15. The second written demand was served by regular mail upon DAI by service 
upon Ralph J. Marsh, Esq., counsel for DAI. 
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16. DAI refused to release the unlawful Notice of Interest recorded against 
plaintiffs building lots as demanded. 
17. On March 8, 2002, DAI filed a lawsuit in Third District Court against Peaden 
and captioned, Development Associates, Inc. v. Gene Peaden, Civ. No. 020902121 (the 
"Litigation"). A copy of the complaint in that action is attached as Exhibit H. 
18. On or about March 13, 2002, DAI caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be 
recorded against Peaden's lots 320, 334, 379, 380 and 555. 
19. The Notice of Lis Pendens states in relative part as follows: 
Notice is hereby given that a legal action between the above-named parties is 
pending in the above-entitled court affecting the title to the real property located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah . . . 
20. A true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Lis Pendens is attached as 
Exhibit D and incorporated herein. 
21. In the foregoing action, DAI asserted three claims of quantum meruit and/or 
unjust enrichment against Peaden arising out of the improvements which were allegedly made 
to the plaintiffs building lots. 
22. There is nothing in the complaint, which if true, would support an interest in 
Penden's lots in favor of DAI. 
23. Plaintiff moved to dismiss DAFs complaint for failing to state a claim for relief. 
After the motion was briefed by both sides, Judge William B. Bohling held a hearing on the 
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matter. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court dismissed DAI's complaint for failing to 
state a claim for relief on three separate alternative grounds. 
24. On December 2, 2002, Judge William B. Bohling made and entered his Order 
Dismissing Case and awarding costs to Peaden. As part of the Court's Order Dismissing Case, 
the Court determined that 
Utah law does not allow for the filing of a notice of interest against another's 
property for alleged incidental improvements made thereto. The Court 
concludes that the proper method for filing a lien against another's property for 
improvements to real property should be made against such property pursuant to 
the procedures provided for in Utah Mechanics Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §38-
1-1 et. seq. The Court concludes that plaintiff admitted to the Court at hearing 
that it did not comply with the Act. 
Order Dismissing Case, p. 7, f 21. 
25. The Court also concluded that DAI's "Notice of Interest was not lawfully 
recorded against Peaden's lots" because DAI admitted that it had failed to comply with the 
Mechanics Lien Act for the filing of a lien against Peaden's property. 
26. A copy of the Order Dismissing Case is attached as Exhibit E. 
27. Notwithstanding the ruling of the Third District Court and the dismissal of its 
action, DAI has refused to release its Notice of Lis Pendens which claims an interest in the five 
lots owned by Gene Peaden. 
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaration that DAI's Notice of Interest was Wrongful 
and that its Notice of Lis Pendens remains Wrongful) 
28. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
29. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1 provides that a "wrongful lien" means any document 
that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property 
and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) Expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) Authorized by or contained in an order of judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction; or 
(c) Signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
real property. 
30. Peaden alleges that the Notice of Interest which DAI caused to be filed and the 
associated Notice of Lis Pendens were not: 
(a) Expressly authorized by this chapter or by other state or federal statute; 
(b) Authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) Signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by Peaden, who is 
and has been the lawful owner of the Property. 
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31. Indeed, the Third District Court has already found and ordered that DAI's 
Notice of Interest was not lawfully recorded against [Peaden's] Property. (A copy of the 
Court's Order is attached as Exhibit E.) 
32. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff Peaden is entitled to the declaratory relief 
prayed for below. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Damages Against DAI Relating to Lot 199) 
33. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
34. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 provides as follows: 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real 
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused 
by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the 
wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a record interest 
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of 
the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or for 
treble damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
35. As heretofore alleged, on January 10, 1997, DAI caused a Notice of Interest to 
be recorded against numerous lots owned by Peaden. 
36. The Notice of Interest allegedly related to the installation of improved roads, 
curb & gutter, and water, sewer, power, fuel and telephone system connections to the 
Property. 
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37. A copy of the Notice of Interest is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
38. The Notice of Interest provides that DAI claimed and asserted an "interest" in 
Peaden's building lots as follows: "[T]he undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby 
claims and asserts an interest in subject property pursuant to their improvements and 
developments which benefit the following described property". (A copy of the Order 
Dismissing Case is attached as Exhibit E). 
39. Because the foregoing Notice of Interest was recorded against the foregoing 
building lot, Peaden could not convey a fee simple interest in the lot to Brad Allen or other 
buyers of the property. 
40. Because the Notice of Interest was recorded against Lot 199, Peden caused his 
prior attorneys to give written notice to DAI to release its Notice of Interest against lot 199 
under the foregoing subsection. 
41. Accordingly, on May 26, 1999, written demand was made upon DAI to have 
the Notice of Interest released and removed from the foregoing lot. 
42. The written demand was send to DAI by certified mail with a copy to DAI's 
attorney. 
43. A copy of this written demand is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
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44. Despite the foregoing demand, DAI refused to release its unlawful Notice of 
Interest, 
45. On February 2000, Gene Peaden contracted to sell lot 199 to Brad L. Allen and 
Juliann S. Allen. 
46. However, Peaden could not convey lot 199 to the Aliens because of the DAI's 
Notice of Interest was recorded against the lot. 
47. As a result of the foregoing, Peaden was required to escrow the sum of 
approximately $7,500 to obtain a release from DAI of the unlawful Notice of Interest on Lot 
199. 
48. In addition to the foregoing amounts, defendant Peaden also incurred incurred 
other additional damages because DAI would not remove its unlawful Notice of Interest from 
the lot. 
49. Had DAI removed the Notice of Interest from the Property as required by law, 
Gene Peaden would not have been required to pay the $7,500 to DAI. 
50. As a result of the foregoing, Gene Peaden has suffered damages in an amount to 
be proven at trial. Because DAI refused to release the Notice of Interest as required by law, 
Peaden is also entitled to award of treble damages Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. 
51. Based upon the foregoing, Peaden is entitled to the relief prayed for below. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Damages Against DAI for Lot 321) 
52. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
53. In 2000 Gene Peaden also attempted to sell lot 321 to Ferron Martin. 
54. However, because DAI's unlawful Notice of Interest had been recorded against 
lot 321, Peaden could not convey fee simple interest in the lot to Mr. Martin. 
55. As a result of the foregoing, the title company required Peaden to escrow 
$12,000.00 with the title company in order to obtain a release of the unlawful Notice of 
Interest that DAI had recorded against lot 321. 
56. As a result of the foregoing, Peaden was compelled to escrow $12,000.00 in 
order to obtain a release of the Notice of Interest against Lot 321. 
57. As a result of DAI's refusal to release the foregoing Notice of Interest, Gene 
Peaden has suffered damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 
58. Because DAI refused to release the Notice of Interest as required by law, Gene 
Peaden is also entitled to award of treble damages against DAI pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
38-9-4. 
59. Based upon the foregoing, Gene Peaden is entitled to the relief prayed for 
below. 
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Wrongful Notice of Lis Pendens Against Lots 320, 334, 379, 380 and 555) 
60. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
61. On January 10, 1997, DAI recorded a Notice of Interest to be recorded against 
numerous other lots owned by Gene Peaden. 
62. The Notice of Interest allegedly related to the installation of improved roads, 
curb & gutter, and water, sewer, power, fuel and telephone system connections to the 
Property. 
63. A copy of the Notice of Interest is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
64. The Notice of Interest asserted wrongully that DAI had an "interest" in Peaden's 
lots. 
65. On May 26, 1999, written demand was made upon DAI to have the Notice of 
Interest released and removed from the records of Salt Lake County. 
66. A copy of this written demand is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
67. The foregoing demand was served by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
upon DAI. 
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68. On October 1, 1999, a second written demand was again made upon DAI to 
have its Notice of Interest released and removed from the records of Salt Lake County as a 
claim against Peaden's lots. 
69. On March 8, 2002, DAI filed a lawsuit in Third District Court against Peaden 
captioned, Development Associates, Inc. v. Gene Peaden, Civ. No. 020902121 (the 
"Litigation"). 
70. On March 13, 2002, defendant filed a Notice of Lis Pendens against Peaden's 
Lots. The Lis Pendens relates to the Notice of Interest filed by DAI against Gene Peaden's 
property. 
71. In April, 2003, Gene Peaden made written demand that DAI release its Notice 
of Lis Pendens from Peaden's lots. 
72. A copy of the foregoing letter is attached as Exhibit F. 
73. However, DAI has refused to release its Lis Pendens. 
74. A copy of DAI's written response is attached as Exhibit G and incorporated 
herein. 
75. Based upon the foregoing, Gene Peaden is entitled to the relief prayed for 
below. 
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Slander of Title / Puntive Damages ) 
76. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
77. On January 10, 1997, DAI a Notice of Interest was recorded against numerous 
lots owned by Gene Peaden. 
78. The Notice of Interest allegedly related to the installation of improved roads, 
curb & gutter, and water, sewer, power, fuel and telephone system connections to the 
Property. 
79. A copy of the Notice of Interest is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
80. The Notice of Interest wrongly asserted that DAI has an interest in Peaden's 
lots. 
81. On May 26, 1999, written demand was made upon DAI to have the Notice of 
Interest released and removed from the records of Salt Lake County as a claim against 
Peaden's Property. 
82. A copy of this written demand is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
83. The foregoing demand was served by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
upon DAI. 
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84. On October 1, 1999, written demand was again made upon DAI to have its 
Notice of Interest released and removed from the records of Salt Lake County as a claim 
against Peaden's lots. 
85. On March 8, 2002, DAI filed a lawsuit in Third District Court against Peaden 
and captioned, Development Associates, Inc. v. Gene Peaden, Civ. No. 020902121 (the 
"Litigation"). 
86. On March 13, 2002, defendant filed a Notice of Lis Pendens against Peaden's 
Lots. 
87. The Lis Pendens relates to the Notice of Interest filed by DAI against Gene 
Peaden's property. 
88. In April, 2003, Gene Peaden again demanded that DAI release its Notice of Lis 
Pendens against Peaden's lots. 
89. However, DAI refused to release its Lis Pendens. 
90. A copy of the foregoing letter is attached as Exhibit F. 
91. A copy of its written response is attached as Exhibit G and incorporated herein. 
92. The refusal of DAI to release a Lis Pendens from its property when the action 
referenced therein makes no claim for an interest in property constitutes a defamation of title. 
93. Peaden has suffered damages as a result of the defamation of title made to his 
building lots, which damages Peaden should be entitled to recover at trial. 
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94. DATs intentional conduct in recording an unlawful Notice of Interest against 
Peaden's building lots for the purpose of extracting money from Peaden was done willfully and 
intentionally by DAI. 
95. The foregoing conduct is extreme and outrageous, and therefore the Court 
should make and enter an award of punitive damages against DAI. 
96. Based upon the foregoing, Gene Peaden is entitled to the relief prayed for 
below. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Attorneys Fees and Costs Against DAI) 
97. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
98. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(2), (3) and (7) provide for an award of attorneys' fees 
and costs to Peaden when a wrongful lien has been recorded against his Property. 
99. Based on the claims set forth in this petition, Peaden is entitled to an award of 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by him since May 26, 1999. 
100. Based upon the foregoing, Peaden is entitled to the relief prayed for below. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Expungment of Unlawful Lis Pendens) 
101. Peaden realleges and incorporates all of the foregoing paragraphs herein by 
reference. 
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102. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-6 provides that if the Court determines that the document 
constitutes a wrongful lien, that the Court should make and enter an "order declaring the 
wrongful lien void ab initio, [and] releas[e] the property from the lien[.]" 
103. The Notice of Interest recorded by DAI is indeed wrongful and therefore, 
Peaden is entitled to an order declaring the wrongful lien void ab initio, and releasing the 
Property from the improper claim. 
104. Based upon the foregoing, Peaden is entitled to the relief prayed for below. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Gene Peaden, the Plaintiff herein, prays the Court to make and enter 
an order providing the following relief: 
1. Pursuant to Peaden's First Claim for Relief, an order declaring that the Notice 
of Interest which is presently recorded against Peaden's Property is wrongful. 
2. Pursuant to Peaden's Second Claim for Relief, an order declaring the Notice of 
Interest was an unlawful claim, encumbrance or cloud upon Peaden's property, and awarding 
any and all damages incurred by defendant Peaden as a result of the wrongful lien. 
3. Pursuant to Peaden's Third Claim for Relief, an order awarding treble damages 
to Peaden against DAI for all damages sustained by Peaden as a result of DAI's recording of 
the unlawful Notice of Interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4. 
4. Pursuant to Peaden's Fourth Claim for Relief, an order awarding statutory 
damages of $3,000 with respect to each of the building lots from which DAI refused to release 
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it unlawful Notice of Interest after statutory demand was made upon DAI for the removal 
thereof, and for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs against DAI, which Peaden 
has incurred since May 26, 1999, the date of initial request for removal, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9-4. 
5. Pursuant to Peaden's Fourth Claim for Relief, for an order of punitive damages 
against DAI in an amount no less than five times the amount of any actual damages established 
by Peaden at trial as a result of DAI's intentional and unlaw conduct. 
5. Pursuant to Peaden's Fifth and Sixth's Claims for Relief, for a judgment for all 
statutoiy and common law damages which Gene Peaden has and will sustain, with the amount 
of such damages to be proved at trial. 
6. Pursuant to Peaden's Seventh Claim for Relief, for an order expunging the 
unlawful Notice of Lis Pendens recorded by DIA against each of the Gene Peaden's lots. 
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7. For such further legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and 
appropriate in the premises. 
DATED this \Q day of October, 2003. 
Petitioner's Address 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven W. Call 
Benjamin J. Kotter 
Gene Peaden 
5307 South KnoIIcrest Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
704703 
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